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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
THE RULE AGAINST INDESTRUCTIBILITY OF TRUSTS IN
PENNSYLVANIA
"Trusts are destructible if the cestuis, who being of age and of
sound mind, call for a conveyance of the legal estate, possession oe
the res, and a termination of the trust."1
Trusts are indestructible when there is a provision that the trust may not
terminate for a definite period of time or until the happening of a certain event,
even though the cestuis are not under any disabilities and ordinarily could termin-
ate the trust, and such a provision is held to be valid. Pennsylvania has recognized
the validity of such provisions." This being true, the problem then arises as to
how long the trust may last or whether there is a limitation upon their duration.
It has been said that a rule setting the period for which trusts may remain
indestructible seems only in the process of formulation.8 However, since this
statement was made, it appears that this rule has gone beyond the formative stage.
While the existence of the rule seems no longer to be in doubt,4 there are
conflicting views as to whether the rule is a separate one, or a part of the rule
against perpetuities which fixes the limit beyond which future interests cannot be
created."
Professor Gray states the rule against perpetuities as follows:
"No interest is good unless it must vest if at all not later than twenty
one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest."
6
The same authority and others7 contend that since this rule deals with the
time within which an interest must vest, it does not have anything to do with the
duration of a trust, and therefore, if a rule exists as to the duration of a trust it is
separate from the rule against perpetuities.
In Pennsylvania the courts have not recognized the existence of a separate
rule and have not referred to or discussed a separate one, but have treated it as
a part of the rule against perpetuities.8 The Pennsylvania cases when dealing with
the duration of trusts confound the problem with that of vesting of interests.
Notwithstanding this, it is to be remembered that the rule against perpetuities deals
only with the remoteness of the vesting of interests, while the rule of indestruc-
tibility places a limitation upon the duration of trusts.
11 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935), Sec. 218.
2Henderson's Estate, 258 Pa. 510, 102 A. 217 (1917).
377 U. OF PA. L. REv. 872, The Rule Against Indestructibility of Trusts.
4Fitchie v. Brown, 211 U.S. 321, 29 S. Ct. 106 (1908); Seidler v. Syms, 56 N.J. Eq.
275, 38 A. 424 (1897); 1 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935), Sec. 218.5 GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST 'PERPETUITIES (4th ed. 1942), Sec. 1.
61bid., Sec. 201.
7 [bid., Sec. 3; 1 Scorr, TRUSTS (1939), Sec. 6210; FOULKE, RULE AGAINST PER-
PETUTIES (1909), Sec. 375; 2 SIMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS, (1935), See 553 says a separate rule
probably exists.
SJohnston's Estate, 185 Pa. 179, 39 A. 879 (1898); Stephen's Estate, 129 Pa. Super. 396,
195 A. 653 (1937).
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
The rule of indestructibility of trusts provides that no trust of a private na-
ture may be created to endure for a time longer than lives in being and twenty-one
years, plus a gestation period, or for a period of twenty-one years only where the
measure of lives is not availed of.9
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the existence of the rule
in stating, "it is conceded by all that the utmost extent of a trust at common law
is limited by lives in being at its creation and for twenty-one years thereafter."10
The adoption of this period as the period of the permissible duration of these
trusts may be due to the fact that the same policy, 1 the avoidance of undue re-
straints on alienation, lies back of both the rule against perpetuities and the rule
against the indestructibility of trusts. While a trust may be created to endure for
a long period of time and its primary object may not be to restrain the alienability
of property, the practical, indirect effect accomplishes the same result. A trust is
thus just as surely an indirect restraint on alienation as is a contingent future in-
terest.
12
The effect of the rule against perpetuities as applied in Pennsylvania to the
duration of trusts may be considered under the following classifications: charitable
trusts, trusts for specific non-personal objects, and ordinary private trusts.
CHARITABLE TRUSTS
The rule does not apply to the duration of charitable trusts. Therefore they
may be created to last for a period longer than that prescribed by the rule, or for-
ever. 13
The rule against perpetuities considered as a rule against remoteness of vest-
ing is applicable to charitable trusts, except where a gift in trust for one charity is
to take effect after a gift in trust for another charity. 14  The fact that in one in-
stance a charitable trust is affected by the rule against perpetuities, and in another,
when treated as a rule applicable to the duration of a trust, it is not affected, is an
indication of the existence of a distinct rule as to the indestructibility of trusts,
whether or not it be treated as a separate one or as a part of the rule against the
remoteness of vesting of interests.
The policy of the law in allowing charitable trusts to be created to last forever
is that the social advantages gained from such a trust outweigh the disadvantages
of permitting a donor to put restraints on the alienation of his property which
may last far into the future. 15
'Seidler v. Sims, 56 N. J. Eq. 275, 38 A. 424 (1897).
1OFitchie v. Brown, 211 U.S. 321, 29 S. Ct. 106 (1908).
I1GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (4th. ed. 1942), Sec. 21.
'zMetz, Rule Against Perpetuities and Private Trusts, 4 U. OF PITT. L. REv. 157, 159.
13Steven's Estate, 164 Pa. 209, 30 A. 243 (1894); Estate of Smith, 181 Pa. 109, 37 A.
14 (1897); Hunter's Estate, 279 Pa. 349, 123 A. 865 (1924).
14 GRAY, op. Cit., SeCs. 591, 597.
1 5
BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935), Sec. 352.
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SPECIFIC NON-PERSONAL OBJECTS TRUSTS
In the case of Hillyard v. Miller,16 where the trust was created to maintain per-
petually a loan office and loan fund where and from which farmers and mechan-
ics could borrow money at the usual rate of interest, it thus being a trust for a
specific non-personal object the court held it was void as violating the rule against
perpetuities. The court in its opinion stated that the trust is "but a naked and in-
valid trust of indefinite continuance. No trust of this class can be allowed to last
beyond the period for the vesting of an executory limitation . . ."17 The court
therefore clearly applied the rule against perpetuities not as to the vesting of an in-
terest but as to the duration of the trust.
In a later case' 8 the court upheld the application of the residue of an estate
to the erection of a monument at the grave of the testator even though this was
for a sp'ecific non-personal object of indefinite duration.
In view of these decisions the Pennsylvania legislature early realized that the
desirable trusts of this class might often be invalidated because they violate the
rule against indestructibility of trusts. 19  A statute was enacted in 1891 which
provides:
"No disposition of property hereafter made for the maintenance or
care of any cemetery, churchyard, or other place for burial of the
dead, or of any portion thereof, or grave therein, or monuments or
other erections on or about the same, shall fail by reason of such dis-
position having been made in perpetuity, but said disposition shall
be held to b'e made for a charitable use.''20
This statute clearly permits certain kinds of trusts for specific non-personal objects
to be made perpetual, though other trusts in the same class not within its provis-
ions are invalid as being in violation of the rule against indestructibility.
In Palethorp's EstaIe,21 a trust was created for the care of a cemetery lot, and
the support and maintenance of a person to care for the lot, who was also to show
people where the grave was, and to perform such other duties as the trustees might
designate. The Supreme Court held that the bequest in trust to maintain a family
burial lot and to support a person to care for it was void as a perpetuity, except,
in so far as the reasonable care of the lot and structure thereon is concerned and
that the testator by providing for the maintenance of a person to perform other
specified duties had clearly made a gift for purposes not contemplated in the Act
of 1891.
1610 Pa. 326 (1849).
171bid., at 334 and 338.
18Bainbridge's Appeal, 97 Pa. 483 (1881).
19Wolfe, Honorary Trusts in Pennsylvania, 42 DICK. L. REv. 161, 165
20Act of May 26, 1891, P.L. 119 Sec. 1, 9 PS 4.
21249 Pa. 389, 94 A. 1060 (1915).
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A later case, Estate of Deaner,22 like the Palethorp case, involved a trust
created after the Act of 1891 was enacted. This was a trust for the perpetual up-
keep of graves. The Superior Court also held that the trust being perpetual was
valid only because it fell within the exceptions made by the Act of 1891.
Stephan's Estate"3 is a recent decision of the Superior Court where a gift was
made to an unincorporated association of individuals, as trustee, for the perpetual
care and upkeep of a memorial. The court said that there is no indication that
the trust has any religious or charitable purpose whatever. The trust was one
within th- category of trusts for specific non-personal objects and since it did not
fall within the exceptions made by the Act of 1891 it was void in that it might
endure perpetually. This case therefore holds that not only are trusts invalid that
are for specific non-personal objects not within the provisions of the Act of 1891,
but also that the rule against indestructibility also applies to trusts for unincorpor-
ated associations.
As a general proposition the rule against perpetuities, as applied to the dura-
tion of trusts, does apply to trusts for specific non-personal objects, with such ex-
ceptions being made as are provided for in the Act of 1891.
ORDINARY PRIVATE TRUSTS
The Pennsylvania courts have held ordinary private trusts, as distinguished
from trusts for specific non-personal objects, valid, although it is obvious that they
might endure for a period longer than that applied by the rule against perpetuities.
In other instances similar trusts have been declared invalid.
First, as to the line of cases which indicate that the rule against indestructi-
bility does not apply to ordinary trusts:
In Rhodes Estate,"' the testator gave his whole estate to trustees to pay one-
half the net income to his wife for life, one-fourth to his daughter for life. After
the death of the wife, the daughter was to receive one-half of the net income from
the estate during her life. If the daughter died, leaving a child or children sur-
viving her under the age of twenty-five years, the trustees were directed to pay
such child or children the sum of $350 a year, each, until they respectively arrived
at the age of twenty-five years; the estate was to remain in the hands of the trustee
without division until all the said children should attain the age of twenty-five.
At that time, the principal was to be distributed equally among the children of
the testator's brothers and sisters that were alive at the time of his daughter's
death. The daughter of the testator claimed the entire estate on the ground that
the remainders were void as violations of the rule against perpetuities and that
she had a life estate under the will, and that the estate thus ineffectually disposed
of passed to her under the intestate laws. The court in denying this claim held
that the remainders to the testator's nieces and nephews vested at the time of the
2298 Pa. Super. 360, (1929).
28129 Pa. Super. 396, 195 A. 653 (1937).
24147 Pa. 227, 23 A. 553 (1892).
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daughter's death and that the rule against perpetuities was not violated, and that
the right of possession of the remainders was postponed in order to secure pay-
ment of the annuities.
Nowhere did the court discuss the duration of the trust as being too long.
It is conceivable that the trust might continue for a period longer than a life or
lives in being and twenty-one years, for as stated in the opinion: "Some of the
daughter's children might not be born at the death of the testator, and may not
reach the age of twenty-five until more than twenty-one years after their mother's
death ... 25 It is to be remembcred also that the trust was created to continue
until the last child of the daughter had attained the age of twenty-five.
In a later case,26 the Supreme Court held that the rule against per-
petuities applies only to the vesting of interests. The court failed to
recognize the existence of a distinct rule against the indestructibility of trusts but
used languageZ7 which indicated that a trust need not be limited in duration. Here
the testator, by his will and codicil thereto, devised six farms to trustees to be held
in trust for seventy-five years after his death. After directing that certain debts
and legacies be paid out of the rents and profits thereof, the balance was to b'e divid-
ed annually and distributed among his children share and share alike. The children
of such of his children as might die during the said period were to take such por-
tion as their deceased parents would have taken, the said mode of distribution to
obtain also to descendants of more remote degree than his children's children.
After the expiration of the seventy-five year period, the trustee was to sell the farms
and divide the proceeds among all the testator's children then in being, share and
share alike, and to the legal descendants of deceased children who take the propor-
tion their parents would have taken had they been living. The court held that the
remainder interests after the expiration of the seventy-five year term were con-
tingent and therefore violated the rule against perpetuities. It further held that
the testator died intestate as to the six farms, for while a prior estate is generally
not affected when an ultimate estate is declared void for remoteness, in this case
the failure of the ulterior estate defeats the main and dominant purpose of the
testator the prior estate having been adopted as a means for the accomplishment
of that which the law forbids.
While it is obvious that the seventy-five year term, as provided for in the
will, might be longer than the lives in being named in the will and twenty-one
years, the court said that the estate "began within the prescribed limits, and it is
of no consequence, so far as concerns the rule (against perpetuities) that it ex-
tends beyond it."
In Endsley v. Hagey,28 the testator willed his whole estate to trustees to pay
the income of it to his wife and daughter and the survivor of them for life. He
251bid., at 230.
Z6Johnston's Estate, 185 Pa. 179, 39 A. 879 (1898).
27 1bid., at 185.
28301 Pa. 158, 151 A. 799 (1930).
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also gave a power to them to sell such part of his real estate as might be needed
for their support. At the death of both the wife and daughter, the testator directed
that the residue of the estate be held in trust for his grandchildren until the young-
est reached thL age of twenty-five, the corpus then to be distributed. The wife
and daughter agreed to sell some real estate. A grandchild objected and denied
their right to convey a fee simple, contending that he had a vested interest in the
realty which could not thus be destroyed. The court in upholding the right of
the life tenant to dispose of the real estate, as directed in the will, held that the
remainders to the grandchildren did not violate the rule against perpetuities.
Here the testator created the trust to continue until the youngest grandchild
reached the age of twenty-five. While the court held the trust valid it is possible
that a grandchild might not be born until after the testator's death and might not
reach the age of twenty-five years until more than twenty-one years after the death
of the life tenants named in the will. The court did not discuss the duration of
the trust as being too long or as affecting the validity of it but merely stated that,
"The estate became fixed in the grandchildren immediately on the termination of
the tenancy of the two granted life interests . . .This disposition did not violate
the rule against perpetuities. The right to take the remainder did not depend upon
the happening of some contingent event, but passed to persons definitely deter-
mined as of the date of the death of the testator. The mere fact that the time
of distribution was deferred, or that unborn grandchildren might share, does not
alter the conclusion."
29
Secondly as to the line of cases which indicate that the rule against indestruc-
tibility does apply to ordinary private trusts:
In a lower court case,30 the settlor deeded property in trust for his eight
children, their heirs and assigns forever. H directed that the trustee should dis-
tribute the corpus of the estate among his children that have attained the age of
twenty-one years, if the trustee thought it safe and prudent to do so; if he did not
think it safe and prudent to do so, then to pay them only the rents and profits. A
committee in lunacy of one of the children filed a bill to compel the trustee to pay
them the sum of the corpus belonging to this child, on the ground that the active
duties of the trust had been performed, and that the trust violated the rule against
perpetuities. The court in allowing the claim said that there was no limitation
that the trust should end within a life or lives and twenty-one years. Thus the
trust could confinue indefinitely merely by the trustee deciding that it is not "safe
and prudent" to distribute the corpus to the children. In deciding that the trust
violated the rule against perpetuities the court said, "all this is in direct conflict
with the policy of the law, which abhors a perpetuity, which favors the alienation
29lbid., at 161.
aoPennsylvania Co. v. Price, 7 Phila. 465 (1870).
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of estates, and which will not allow, out of consideration of public interest, that
property shall be in perpetuity fettered with restrictions which prevent its being
alienated or transferred."'"
In Shallcross's Estate"2 the testator gave property to a trustee in trust for the
minor children of a son, naming them, "until they respectively arrive at a lawful
age, or the survivor of them, or the heirs of such survivor, share and share alike."
By a codicil the testator postponed the bequest until they reached the age of twenty-
five years. All the grandchildren survived the testator. The court in its opinion
said that the trust which was created for the grandchildren during their minority
was good, but the subsequent provision of the codicil, postponing the payment un-
til they severally attained the age of twenty-five years, was void, as contrary to the
rule against perpetuities. While it was the wish of the testator to postpone pay-
ment, "this desire cannot be upheld, as it is against the rule of public policy, for-
bidding restraint in the use or disposition of property, in which no one but the
beneficiary has any interest."
In Bender v. Bender,33 testatrix gave her estate to trustees for the benefit of
two nephews and a niece. It was further provided that if either of the beneficiar-
ies should die, then the deceased's child or children should receive the parent's
share of the income. Upon the death of the nephews and niece, the trust was
to continue and the income to b'e paid to the named grand-nephews and grand-
nieces for life and when the last one of these had died the trust was to terminate
and the property was to be sold and proceeds distributed among the heirs of all
the children of the nephews and niece. A bill in equity was filed to declare the
testamentary trust invalid as in violation of the rule against perpetuities. The court
dismissed the bill and held that the trust was a good one under the law. It was
stated, that since the testatrix designated the grand-nephews and grand-nieces, she
removed the possibility of a person becoming a beneficiary who might have been
born subsequent to twenty-one years after the testatrix's death. Had she not so
designated them, the trust would have been void as a perpetuity. The court held
that since the grand-nephews and grand-nieces were all lives in being at the time
of testatrix's death, and since the trust was to last only until the death of the sur-
vivor of them, the remainders over at the end of the trust would vest within the
period permitted by the rule against perpetuities.
In a recent case, 4 one of testator's ten children filed a petition to terminate
a testamentary trust claiming that the testator created an unlawful perpetual trust.
The testator created the trust for his children but did not say anything as to how
long the trust should last. The court held that the omission of a provision express-
ly setting forth the intended duration of a trust will not in itself support an im-
plication that a perpetual trust was created. The court in construing the will
813bid., at 468.
32200 Pa. 122, 49 A. 936 (1901).
33225 Pa. 434, 64 A. 246 (1909).
24Shaw's Estate, 342 Pa. 182, 20 A. (2d) 202 (1941).
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creating the trust said it showed a primary intent to benefit the testator's children
and held that his purpose would be accomplished upon the death of the last child
and that the trust was not void as a perpetual trust, but was a valid and active trust.
From the language of the court it could be inferred that, had the testator set
forth the duration of the trust and had it been longer than the period allowed by
the rule against perpetuities, the court might have declared the trust void.
Two other cases of similar import are Goehring's AppeaP3r and Briggs v.
Davis.8
This latter group of cases is directly in conflict with those that indicate the
rule against indestructibility does not apply to ordinary private trusts. It has been
said that the decisions of this latter group of cases are fallacious.3 7 'If this is true
the ultimate conclusion is that the rule does not apply and thereby limit the dura-
tion of ordinary private trusts.
If we continue to accept the rule that ordinary private trusts may be created
to last for any period of time, we obviously are casting aside and rendering of no
effect the policy of the common law38 which seeks to prevent restraints on aliena-
tion of property.
It is to be desired that some clear and express statement of the rule against
indestructibility be made in Pennsylvania as well as a definite application of it to
the ordinary private trusts.
Since the Pennsylvania Supreme Court by some of its decisions refuses to re-
strict the duration of these ordinary private trusts, and since other decisions cast
doubt upon those cases which allow unlimited duration of trusts, it appears that
the only solution is by legislation. By this latter method not only could a limita-
tion be enacted into our law, but as in the case of trusts for specific non-personal
objects,"9 any present or future confusion as to the application of the rule against
indestructibility would be set at rest.
RUSSELL G. WEIDNER
381 2 Pa. 283 (1875).
36811/2 Pa. 470 (1875).
374 U. oF PITT. L. REv. 169.3 8Note 9, supra.
8
9 Note 18, supra.
